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The CONVERGE! conference took place at a moment of opportunity 
and challenge for advocacy to end gender violence.
1
 At the same time 
that law, policies, and programs to address gender violence globally have 
expanded, the critiques that many at this conference have raised surface 
the limitations of generations of reform. Intimate partner and sexual 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. This essay has been adapted from an 
article titled, Julie Goldscheid, Gender Neutrality, the ‗Violence against Women‘ Frame, 
and Transformative Reform, originally published at 82 UMKC L. REV. 623 (2014) 
[hereinafter Goldscheid, Gender Neutrality]. Published with permission from UMKC L. 
REV. Professor Goldscheid participated on the following panel, however, her remarks 
have been redacted: Andrea Ritchie et al., Plenary 2—Redefining Gender Violence, 5 U. 
MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 289 (2015). 
 
Recommended Citation: Julie Goldscheid, Gender Neutrality and the ―Violence Against 
Women‖ Frame, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 307 (2015). 
 
1 This essay uses the terms gender violence, intimate partner violence, domestic 
violence, and sexual violence to refer generally to the range of violent acts that are 
committed primarily by men against women, including physical and coercive violence 
between intimate partners, sexual assault, and stalking. 
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violence continue to be committed at alarming rates,
2
 and gender-based 
stereotypes still infuse legal doctrine, system responses, and public 
discourse.
3
 Historically, the movement to end intimate partner and sexual 
violence’s transformative power lay, in large part, in its roots in political 
anti-oppression organizing.
4
 Nevertheless, today’s service delivery 
networks suffer critiques as mainstreamed, bureaucratized arms of the 
state.
5
 The dominant policy emphasis on criminal justice interventions 
has alienated communities, particularly along lines of race, immigration 
                                                                                                             
2 For example, a recent survey found that on average, twenty-four people per minute 
are victims of rape, physical violence, or stalking by an intimate partner in the United 
States. Violence Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, available 
at www.cdc.ov/violenceprevention/nisvs/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). See also, e.g., 
Michele C. Black et al., Nat‘l Ctr. for Disease Control, Intimate Partner and Sexual 
Violence Survey (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nisvs/ 
(finding, inter alia, that nearly one in four women and one in seven men have 
experienced severe physical violence by a current or former partner and that one in five 
women and one in seventy-one men have been raped at some point in their lives). These 
statistics are likely to undercount the prevalence of both intimate partner and sexual 
violence as these crimes are often the most underreported. See CALLIE M. RENNISON, U.S. 
DEP’T JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL 
ATTENTION, 1992-2000 2 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
rsarp00.pdf. 
3 See, e.g., MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ, POLICE INVESTIGATION OF RAPE—ROADBLOCKS 
AND SOLUTIONS 53-54 (2010) (finding, inter alia, that despite many years of training, 
many police officers maintain stereotypic attitudes towards complainants in rape cases); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 46-48 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
nopd.php (detailing stereotyped responses to intimate partner and sexual violence 
complainants); Lynn H. Schafran, Barriers to Credibility: Understanding and Countering 
Rape Myths, available at: http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J1/SAPR/
SARCVATraining/Barriers_to_Credibility.pdf; Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, 
Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and 
the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Naomi Cahn & Joan 
Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 353-55 (1995); see also, e.g., BLACK WOMEN’S BLUEPRINT, available 
at http://www.blackwomensblueprint.org/sexual-violence/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) 
(describing mass education campaign to eradicate stereotypes regarding black women’s 
sexuality and other cultural norms that perpetuate sexual violence). 
4 See, e.g., BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND 
AMERICA’S PRISON NATION 68–69 (2012); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE 
VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 29–52 
(1982); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 11–23 
(2000). 
5 See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: 
A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE (2008); 
LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM (2011); RICHIE, supra note 4, at 66–98; G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: 
Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women‘s 
Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 276–77 (2005). 
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status, gender expression and other marginalized identities.
6
 As Beth 




This essay considers how we might draw from those critiques to best 
advance a movement that supports comprehensive and empowering 
services, and that aims to transform the cultural norms that continue to 
sanction gender violence.
8
 It revisits the now-common gender-specific 
frame ―violence against women.‖ That frame was developed in service of 
feminist goals such as foregrounding and challenging gender bias and 
fostering more inclusive delivery of social and other services.
9
 It is by no 
means the only term used in connection with gender violence reforms, 
but it has become a standard description globally for laws, programs, and 
services addressing intimate partner and sexual violence, as well as for 
the violence itself.
10
 Although this terminology question is familiar, it 
                                                                                                             
6 See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM 
APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1–15 (2008); 
GOODMARK, supra note 5; RICHIE, supra note 4, at 82–84, 97–124; Donna Coker, Crime 
Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001); Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender 
Violence in a Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J. L & POL’Y 13, 35–36 (2011); Andrea Smith 
et al., The Color of Violence: Introduction, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! 
ANTHOLOGY (2006); see generally, e.g., NATALIE J. SOKOLOFF WITH CHRISTINA PRATT, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND 
CULTURE (Natalie J. Sokoloff ed., 2005). 
7 RICHIE, supra note 4, at 97. 
8 For further discussion, see Goldscheid, Gender Neutrality, supra note *. 
9 See, e.g., RICHIE, supra note 4, at 89–90 (explaining that the original construction of 
what she terms the ―every-woman‖ analysis was an intentional and strategic move to 
avoid stereotyping those who use violence and the women who experience it, and to 
ensure that members of elite groups took the problem seriously). 
10 In the United States, the federal Violence Against Women Act is perhaps the most 
prominent example. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code, including 
§§ 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42); Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464 (2000); Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1902 (1994). For examples from global initiatives, see, e.g., Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 
(Dec. 20, 1993); Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence 
Against Women and Domestic Violence, Preamble, May 11, 2011, C.E.T.S No. 210; 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women, ―Convention of Belem do Para,‖ Jun. 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. No. A61, 
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-61.html; Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/
publication/UNTS/Volume%201249/v1249.pdf (defining ―gender-based violence‖ as a 
form of discrimination against women). 
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warrants revisiting as global initiatives gain prominence and the gender-
specific language continues to be inscribed and codified. 
This essay argues that on the whole, the gender-specific ―violence 
against women‖ term no longer does the work feminists hoped it would 
do, and that its associated limitations outweigh its utility. I group those 
limitations into four categories and argue that the gender-specific 
―violence against women‖ frame is problematic empirically, 
theoretically, politically and legally, and practically. This essay will 
briefly elaborate those problems, and will draw on frame theory, a tool 
that has been used in analyzing social movements, to support the 
conclusion that we should shift from using the gender-specific ―violence 
against women‖ frame as a default. Instead, we should default to gender-
neutral terminology such as ―gender violence‖ or descriptive terms such 
as ―intimate partner violence,‖ or ―sexual assault.‖ Terminology should 
be intentionally selected to advance the goals of the particular context in 
which the language is invoked, whether that is legislative, policy, or 
program-based. In consciously selecting terminology, we should 
recognize that gender-neutral terminology need not be politically neutral. 
Instead, our rhetoric and discourse should advance new and creative 
strategies to challenge the structural inequalities that continue to inform 
the experience and ramifications of gender violence and that advance the 
fundamental goal of ending gender violence in all its forms. 
I. LIMITS TO THE FRAME 
Advocates have lauded the gender-specific ―violence against 
women‖ frame for its explicit focus on the disproportionate ways acts of 
violence, such as intimate partner violence and sexual assault, impact 
women.
11
 The hope was that this express link would support advocacy, 
organizing, and reform that would frame the problem as a social and 
political concern, and as explicitly tied to historic and ongoing gender-
based biases and discrimination.
12
 By focusing directly on the impact on 
                                                                                                             
11 See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 216–218; SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 11–28; 
Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence: Examining the Intersections of 
Race, Class, and Gender, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, 
CLASS, GENDER, AND CULTURE 1, 2 (Natalie J. Sokoloff ed., 2005); see also, e.g., MOLLY 
DRAGIEWICZ, EQUALITY WITH A VENGEANCE: MEN’S RIGHTS GROUPS, BATTERED WOMEN, 
AND ANTIFEMINIST BACKLASH 8–10 (2011) (describing definitional debates); ALICE 
EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 21 
(2010) (also describing definitional debates). 
12 For discussion of the link between abuse and gender bias, see, e.g., DRAGIEWICZ, 
supra note 11, at 10–12; SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 29–34, 217–218, 228–234; 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 12–13; Reva Siegel, ―The Rule of Love:‖ Wife Beating as 
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). 
2015] GENDER NEUTRALITY & THE "VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN" FRAME 311 
 
women, the frame would challenge those deep and discriminatory 
gendered social norms and would help ensure that gender was not erased 
from popular and policy understandings of and responses to the 
problem.
13
 Nevertheless, empirical, theoretical, political, legal, and 
practical challenges limit its power to advance those transformative 
goals. 
A.  Empirical 
The question whether intimate partner and sexual violence is 
committed primarily by men against women is both well-settled and 
hotly contested; it is squarely posed by use of the gender-specific 
―violence against women‖ frame. At its core, the premise of the gender-
specific lens rests on this empirical question about prevalence. Surveys 
consistently find intimate partner and sexual violence is committed 
overwhelmingly by men against women, both in the United States and 
internationally.
14
 Structural and cultural forces, such as patriarchy and 
the historic ordering of the institutions of marriage and the family, result 
in the phenomenon in which women are overwhelmingly the victims and 
men the perpetrators of abuse, and in which the abuse reflects and 
                                                                                                             
13 See, e.g., Dianne Otto, International Human Rights Law: Towards Rethinking 
Sex/Gender Dualism and Asymmetry, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 197, 204 (Margaret Davies & Vanessa E. Munro eds., 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178769; Margaret (Peggy) Maisel, Have Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions Helped Remediate Human Rights Violations Against 
Women?: A Feminist Analysis of the Past and Formula for the Future, 20 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 143 (2011). 
14 See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that one in five women and one in 
seventy-one men have been raped or sexually assaulted and that three in ten women and 
one in ten men have experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate 
partner); CALLIE M. RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE, 1993–2001, (NCJ-197838 Feb. 2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (showing approximately 85% of victimizations by intimate partners in 
2001 were against women); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IV 17–
24 (NCJ-181867 July 2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf 
(nearly 25% of women and 7.6% of men surveyed said they had been raped and/or 
physically assaulted by a current or former spouse at some point in their lifetime; women 
experience more intimate partner violence than do men); see also, e.g., Walter S. 
DeKeseredy, Feminist Contributions to Understanding Woman Abuse: Myths, 
Controversies, and Realities, 16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 297, 297–98 (2011). 
For international statistics, see, e.g., World Health Organization, Global and regional 
estimates of violence against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner 
violence and non-partner sexual violence (2013), available at http://www.who.i
nt/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/9789241564625/en/. 
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reinforces traditional gender roles.
15
 This imbalance underscores the 
longstanding feminist insight that much intimate partner and sexual 




Nevertheless, a vigorous debate dominates the empirical literature, in 
which some critique the data concluding that intimate partner violence is 
committed primarily by men against women
17
 and others forcefully 
refute those critiques.
18
 At least some of the differences between survey 
results reflect definitional issues; in other words, surveys produce 
different results because they measure different behaviors using different 
designs and methodologies.
19
 Beyond survey design itself, experts 
distinguish what has been termed ―intimate terrorism,‖ or ―battering‖ 
from what some term ―situational violence,‖ or ―resistive violence.‖
20
 
Surveys that focus on the coercive and controlling behavior that may be 
termed ―battering‖ or ―intimate terrorism‖ may more accurately capture 
the gendered nature of the problem than do tallies that simply count 
instances of violent conduct.
21
 
                                                                                                             
15 See, e.g., DeKeseredy, supra note 14, at 298; DRAGIEWICZ, supra note 11, at 81–
102. 
16 See supra note 12. 
17 See, e.g., Donald G. Dutton et al., The Gender Paradigm in Domestic Violence 
Research and Theory: Part 1—The Conflict of Theory and Data, 10 AGGRESSION & 
VIOLENT BEH. 680 (2005) (citing studies and refuting ―feminist‖ arguments about gender 
impact); Sherry Hamby, The Gender Debate on Intimate Partner Violence: Solutions and 
Dead Ends, 1 PSYCH. TRAUMA 24 (2009) (finding ―moderate gender asymmetry‖ in 
intimate partner violence); Murray A. Straus, Gender Symmetry and Mutuality in 
Perpetration of Clinical-Level Partner Violence: Empirical Evidence and Implications 
for Prevention and Treatment, 16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 279 (2011) (reviewing 
studies and urging recognition of gender symmetry in intimate partner violence). 
18 See, e.g., DRAGIEWICZ, supra note 11, at 81–101; Michael P. Johnson, Gender and 
Types of Intimate Partner Violence: A Response to an Anti-feminist Literature Review, 16 
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEH. 289 (2011). 
19 See Hamby, supra note 17, at 32–33 (discussing definitional issues and suggesting 
approaches to synthesize data). 
20 See, e.g., Ellen Pence & Shamita Das Dasgupta, Praxis Int’l., Inc., Re-Examining 
‗Battering‘: Are All Act of Violence Against Intimate Partners the Same? (June 20, 
2006), available at http://www.praxisinternational.org/files/praxis/files/ReexaminingBat
tering.pdf; MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2008); see also, 
e.g., Joan B. Kellyn & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate 
Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 
476 (2008) (recommending differentiation between different types of intimate partner 
violence in range of family court contexts). 
21 See, e.g., Jennifer Nixon & Cathy Humphreys, Marshalling the Evidence: Using 
Intersectionality in the Domestic Violence Frame, 17 SOC. POL.: INT’L STUD. IN GENDER, 
ST. & SOC’Y 137, 144 (2010); see also, e.g., Pence & Dasgupta, supra note 20; Kellyn & 
Johnson, supra note 20. 
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In addition to statistical problems, the gender-specific frame is 
empirically problematic in that it inaccurately suggests that men are 
never subjected to intimate partner abuse and sexual violence. To the 
contrary, studies consistently confirm the unremarkable fact that men are 




The erasure of violence against men poses a particular problem for 
gay and trans-identified men who are subjected to abuse. Studies indicate 
that gay men experience high rates of intimate partner violence, 
particularly when compared with men living with female partners.
23
 
Transgender people, including those who identify as male, also 
experience high rates of intimate partner violence, though data is 
sparse.
24
 Heterosexual, gay, trans men and trans women are subjected to 
sexual assault as well as intimate partner violence at rates that are 
                                                                                                             
22 See supra note 14. Of course, reported rates of abuse of men may be particularly 
under-inclusive since men may be reluctant to report abuse given dominant social roles 
deeming men to be the aggressor, not the victim. See, e.g., Bennett Capers, Real Rape 
Too, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1266, 1274–76 (2011); see also, e.g., RENNISON, supra note 2 
(discussing under-reporting). 
23 Mikel L. Walters et al., The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey 
(NISVS): 2010 Findings on Victimization by Sexual Orientation 1, (Jan. 2013) available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf (reporting, inter alia, 
that lesbian woman and gay men reported levels of intimate partner violence and sexual 
violence equal to or higher than those of heterosexuals). Reports of rates of violence in 
LGBT relationships generally vary, though studies consistently show that LGBT 
individuals experience intimate partner violence at least at the same rates as heterosexual 
individuals. See, e.g., Adam J. Heintz & Rita M. Helendez, Intimate Partner Violence 
and HIV/STD Risk Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Individuals, 21 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 193, 193 (2006) (LGBTQ people experience domestic 
violence at the same rate as the general population); Elaine Zahnd et al., Nearly Four 
Million California Adults are Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, in UCLA HEALTH 
POLICY RESEARCH BRIEF 5 (April 2010), available at http://www.healthpolicy.ucl
a.edu/pubs/files/ IPV_PB_031810.pdf (bisexual, gay, lesbian or homosexual adults are 
almost twice as likely to experience intimate partner violence as heterosexual adults); see 
also Mitru Ciarlante & Kim Fountain, National Center for Victims of Crime & National 
Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, Why it Matters: Rethinking Victim Assistance for 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Victims of Hate Violence & Intimate 
Partner Violence 4-7 (2010) available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/NCVC_WhyIt
Matters_LGBTQreport_3-2010.pdf (summarizing research) [hereinafter Why it Matters]. 
24 See, e.g., National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
Transgender, Queer and HIV-Affected Intimate Partner Violence, (2010), available at 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/AVP_VoicesOfSurvivorsIPVNarratives_2010.pdf, 
(summarizing research) [hereinafter NCAVP 2010 Report]; Leigh Goodmark, 
Transgender People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the Legal System, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 51, 54-55 & nn.22-24, (2013) (tracking studies); see also, e.g., National Coalition 
of Anti-Violence Programs, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Transgender, Queer and HIV-
Affected Intimate Partner Violence in 2012, (2013), available at http://www.avp.or
g/storage/documents/ncavp_2012_ipv report.final.pdf [hereinafter NCAVP 2012 Report]. 
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difficult to quantify, though no doubt are higher than commonly 
recognized.
25
 The woman-specific frame erases the experiences of these 
survivors and excludes them from services as well as from legal and 
other forms of redress.
26
 
B.  Theoretical 
The gender-specific frame has been a foundational component of 
feminist theory and advocacy seeking to challenge intimate partner and 
sexual violence as a manifestation of patriarchy.
27
 But, it increasingly 
conflicts with theoretical perspectives with which many anti-violence 




1. Queer and Gender Theory 
Queer and gender theorists resist the gender-specific frame for a 
number of reasons. It inscribes an inaccurate and misleading binary view 
of gender.
29
 The frame is inconsistent with many people’s lived 
experiences as well as with contemporary medical technology and 
expertise, which confirm that ―sex‖ is lived on a continuum, rather than 
through the limited categories of male and female.
30
 It normalizes 
sex/gender hierarchies and stereotypes and prevents broader 
                                                                                                             
25 See Capers, supra note 22, at 1266-77 (detailing studies of male rape both inside and 
outside of prison); see also NCAVP 2012 Report, supra note 24, at 8 (reporting that gay 
men, LGBTQ communities of color, LGBTQ youth and young adults, and transgender 
communities experienced the most severe forms of intimate partner violence). 
26 See infra Part I.D. 
27 See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 22; Goodmark, supra note 24, at 90–92; Adele 
M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to ―Straighten Out‖ Criminal Law: What 
Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law‘s Conventional 
Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 89 (2003); 
Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: the Struggle for the Future of Domestic 
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (2004). 
28 For further elaboration, see generally Goldscheid, Gender Neutrality, supra note *, 
at 635–41. 
29 See also, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic 
Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325, 350 
(1999) (urging distinction between gender difference and other forms of privilege and 
power); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian 
Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990) (urging recognition of lesbian 
domestic violence); see generally, e.g., Capers, supra note 22; Otto, supra note 13; 
Morrison, supra note 27; Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What‘s Wrong with 
Women‘s Rights, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98 (2011); JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT 
MATTER (1993). 
30 Rosenblum, supra note 29, at 134–36. 
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understandings of the manifold ways that sex and gender operate as 
technologies of power and oppression.
31
 
Framing intimate partner and sexual violence as violence committed 
by men against women hides the reality of abuse in lesbian and gay 
relationships.
32
 It excludes the complexities of the experiences of lesbian, 
gay, and trans survivors, which may involve different dynamics of 
coercion and control,
33
 and which may challenge dominant Western 
gender-role stereotypes, compounding barriers to obtaining services.
34
 
2. Anti-essentialism and Intersectionality 
Critical race, intersectionality, and anti-essentialism theorists 
contribute to a critique of the gender-specific frame through scholarship 
surfacing the ways single-identity politics conflate or ignore multiple 
dimensions of identity.
35
 Critics have challenged frames for intimate 
partner and sexual violence that use a single axis of identity, charging 
that the unitary focus on ―women‖ amounts to a reference to white 
women.
36
 This single axis of focus obscures the complexities of 
survivors’ experiences and fails to take into account the variability in 
survivors’ experiences of abuse based on structural factors other than 
gender, such as race, immigration status, class, and gender identity.
37
 As 
                                                                                                             
31 Otto, supra note 13, at 200. 
32 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., NAT’L COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN 
2012 (2013), available at http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/ncavp_2012_ipvreport.
final.pdf; see also, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 24 (detailing the experiences of trans 
victims of abuse). 
34 See Dena Hassouneh & Nancy Glass, The Influence of Gender Role Stereotyping on 
Women‘s Experiences of Female Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence, 14 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 310 (2008). 
35 See, e.g., Patricia H. Collins, The Tie That Binds: Race, Gender and US Violence, 21 
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 917 (1998); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241, 1242 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of 
Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988). 
36 See, e.g., RICHIE, supra note 4, at 91–92; Crenshaw, supra note 35; Morrison, supra 
note 27, at 88; Rosenblum, supra note 29, at 102. 
37 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 35, at 918–19, 930–36 (focusing on the experiences of 
African-American women and other marginalized groups); Angela P. Harris, Gender, 
Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 779–80 (2000) (arguing that 
feminists’ traditional focus on violence against women obscures the ways race and 
gender shape both violence and the criminal justice system’s response). For example, 
survivors in communities of color and in immigrant communities may prefer community-
based, rather than criminal justice, interventions, due to the ways those communities have 
been adversely impacted by criminal justice responses. See, e.g., Nixon & Humphreys, 
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Beth Richie argues, the gender-specific rhetoric affirming that ―every 
woman can be a victim‖ is ―almost dangerous‖ in that it detracts from the 
possibility of developing a broader social justice analysis.
38
 At a 
minimum, a continued adherence to the ―violence against women‖ frame 
de-emphasizes the insights drawn from intersectionality theory and can 




Notwithstanding the fact that the gender-specific lens grew out of 
feminist theory and advocacy, it nevertheless poses a tension with 
foundational feminist tenets. The woman-specific paradigm is difficult to 
reconcile with traditional feminist critiques of gender stereotypes. 
Theory and advocacy challenging traditional gender roles and 
stereotypes lie at the heart of legal and other feminist initiatives.
40
 
Accordingly, we would expect feminists to acknowledge that women 
have the capacity to be violent, instead of casting women reflexively in 
the role of (presumably non-violent) victim. It perpetuates a gender 
stereotype of its own to assume that women always are the targets rather 
than the perpetrators of violent aggression. Woman-specific framings 
reinforce gendered stereotypes by enshrining images of the weak female 
victim who cannot resist male aggression and who requires protections.
41
 
As Dianne Otto argues, the focus on women as the victims of violence 
has led to protective representations of women that inscribe women’s 
vulnerability and deny women’s agency and autonomy.
42
 To the extent 
                                                                                                             
supra note 21, at 150; see also, e.g., Michele Bograd, Strengthening Domestic Violence 
Theories: Intersections of Race, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Gender, 25 J. MARITAL 
AND FAMILY THERAPY 275 (1999); SOKOLOFF, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing, inter alia, 
differences in the meaning of domestic violence across racial or ethnic lines, the impact 
of class differences, and the ways traditional depictions of domestic violence render gay 
and lesbian battering invisible); Crenshaw, supra note 35. 
38 RICHIE, supra note 4, at 91. 
39 See, e.g., Michele Bograd, supra note 37; Beth E. Richie, A Black Feminist 
Reflection on the Anti-Violence Movement, 25 SIGNS 1133, 1135 (2000); Sokoloff & 
Dupont, supra note 11, at 2. 
40 See, e.g., REBECCA J. COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING: 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2010) (arguing that wrongful gender stereotypes 
must be eliminated to eliminate all forms of gender discrimination); see also, e.g., Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988) (finding that gender stereotypes constituted 
impermissible sex discrimination). 
41 Capers, supra note 22, at 1306-07; see also, e.g., Laurie Kellman, Democrats Raise 
Violence Against Women Act, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2012, available at 
http://news.yahoo.com/democrats-raise-violence-against-women-act-195155112.html 
(quoting Senator Patty Murray as arguing that ―[p]rotecting women against violence 
should not be a partisan issue‖) (emphasis added). 
42 Otto, supra note 13, at 200. 
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that the woman-specific frame feeds images of women as victims, it runs 




C.  ―Backlash‖ Politics and Legal Challenges 
The gender-specific lens also has provided fodder for challenges by 
so-called ―fathers’ rights‖ groups and conservative feminists.
44
 Fathers’ 
rights groups often argue that feminists exaggerate the extent of violence 
perpetrated by men against women; they argue that feminists have 
succeeded in changing the justice system to focus solely on victimization 
of women with the result that the system instead victimizes men.
45
 
Both ―fathers’ rights‖ groups and conservative feminists critique the 
premise that intimate partner and sexual violence reflect male 
subordination of women and gender discrimination.
46
 They argue that 
anti-domestic violence programs, particularly those that employ gender-
specific terminology, constitute reverse discrimination and violate equal 
protection. Some critique batterers’ intervention programs as 
discriminatory because the programs explicitly recognize that acts of 
intimate partner and sexual violence are deeply rooted in historic 
attitudes towards women.
47
 They have brought legal challenges to 
legislation and regulations that codify the woman-specific lens.
48
 
Although those legal challenges generally have not and likely would not 
succeed substantively,
49
 they divert scarce resources from advocacy and 
service organizations and skew the terms of debate. 
The net effect of these challenges has not disturbed the nature or 
delivery of domestic violence services since there was no dispute that 
                                                                                                             
43 See, e.g., GOODMARK, supra note 5; see also, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal 
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 27–
35 (1991). 
44 These conservative feminists also are referred to as ―pseudofeminists.‖ See, e.g., 
Sack, supra note 27, at 1699 n.197. 
45 For a fuller discussion of the role of the ―men’s rights‖ and ―pseudofeminists‖ in 
anti-domestic violence law reform, see, e.g., DRAGIEWICZ, supra note 11; Sack, supra 
note 27, at 1699–1702. 
46 See, e.g., DRAGIEWICZ, supra note 22, at 13-18, 51–60 (detailing arguments). 
47 For descriptions of those programs, see, e.g., Kerry Healey et al., Nat’l Inst. of 
Justice, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal Justice Strategies 17-
18 (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/168638.pdf. 
48 See, e.g., Men & Women Against Discrimination v. Family Protection Servs. Bd., 
725 S.E.2d 756, 758 (W. Va. 2011); Woods v. Horton, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 339 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008) (emphasis added), petition for review denied, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 15055; 
Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs. of Los Angeles, Fam. Servs., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 474, 
477–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1108 (2003). 
49 See, e.g., Goldscheid, Gender Neutrality, supra note *, at nn.111–130. 
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bona fide male survivors could seek services regardless of programmatic 
titles. No doubt, a gender-neutral frame may not have prevented these or 
other cases since the groups that brought these cases likely would 
challenge any reference to historic gender discrimination even if the 
program was framed and delivered in a gender-neutral manner. 
Nevertheless, gender-specific provisions provide fuel for efforts to 
discredit needed services and open the door to challenges that might 
otherwise be avoided. Absent those provisions, the debate might instead 
focus on substantive differences in opinion concerning, for example, 
whether intimate partner violence is fueled by gender discrimination or 
how to shift cultural norms to reduce and ultimately eliminate intimate 
partner and sexual violence. 
D.  Practical 
The ―violence against women‖ frame creates practical issues for 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (―LGBT‖) survivors of intimate 
partner and sexual violence and those who advocate on their behalf. The 
traditional gender frame identifying men as aggressors and women as 
survivors excludes male victims and female perpetrators of abuse in gay 
relationships from services and legal redress.
50
 Gay and trans men may 
see themselves as ineligible for and may in fact be unable to access 
services; trans women may wonder whether they are ―woman enough‖ to 
be considered a victim.
51
 The woman-specific focus may expose 
survivors to additional danger and may jeopardize the viability of needed 
programs and services for men and gender-non-conforming survivors.
52
 
The frame is particularly problematic for transgender people who are 
subjected to suspicious and often hostile pre-screenings before they are 
assessed with respect to whether they are eligible for services.
53
 
From a service delivery perspective, the gender-specific lens uses the 
identity of ―woman,‖ or a survivor’s presentation as a cis-female,
54
 as a 
                                                                                                             
50 A recent case illustrates the perils of gender-specific definitions. A Swedish man 
was cleared of attempted rape after it turned out that the victim was a transsexual man, 
not a woman; the court concluded that the accused could not have committed rape 
because ―he was attempting to rape a woman.‖ Sara Malm, Man Cleared of Attempting 
Rape of Woman – After Female ‗Victim‘ Turned Out to be Male, MAIL ONLINE (July 4, 
2012), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2168577/Man-cleared-atte
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51 Goodmark, supra note 24, at 69. 
52 See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
53 See, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 24, at 67–71 (describing shelter practices for 
admitting trans women). 
54 The term ―cis-gender‖ refers to people whose gender identity is consistent with the 
sex to which they were assigned at birth. Cisgender Definition, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.
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singular proxy for distinguishing victims from survivors. Shelters 
generally adopt the philosophy of ―believing the woman‖ who is seeking 
services. That practice does not help discern which partner is the 
aggressor in lesbian, gay and trans domestic violence cases.
55
 It may 
exacerbate danger if shelters allow a female abusive partner 
unquestioned access to her partner. 
The gender-specific lens exacerbates the risk that lesbian, gay and 
trans survivors may be denied services and that needed programs may be 
denied funding. A growing body of data documents the challenges 
LGBT survivors face in obtaining services.
56
 Problems include a lack of 
LGBT-specific services, a lack of culturally-specific outreach, untrained 
victim assistance providers, non-inclusive reporting forms, an absence of 
LGBT-specific policies and practices, a lack of collaboration between 
LGBT and ―mainstream‖ victim service providers, and a lack of funding 
for LGBT-specific services. Abused gay men may not be able to access 
shelter, since most intimate partner violence shelters do not house men 
and few jurisdictions have LGBTspecific shelter beds available. At the 
same time, when LGBT programs and services are recognized, they may 
be cabined under the gender-specific frame, leading to the awkward 
result of programs providing services addressing violence against 
women, while reassuring that those programs are open to men.
57
 
II. PARSING THE FRAME 
A.  Frame Theory 
The terms ―violence against women,‖ ―gender-based violence,‖ and 
the concepts of gender-specificity versus gender-neutrality can be 
thought of as alternate but related ―frames‖ for the social movement to 
                                                                                                             
COM, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/cis
gender (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
55 See, e.g., Mary Eaton, Abuse by Any Other Name: Feminism, Difference, and 
Intralesbian Violence, in MARTHA A. FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 195, 198 (1994). 
56 See, e.g., NCAVP 2010 Report, supra note 24; Why it Matters, supra note 23 
(reporting results of community-based organizations and victim assistance providers). For 
additional examples, see JANICE L. RISTOCK, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN LGBTQ 
LIVES (2011), and CHING-INCHEN ET AL., THE REVOLUTION STARTS AT HOME: 
CONFRONTING INTIMATE VIOLENCE WITHIN ACTIVIST COMMUNITIES (Ching-In Chen et al. 
eds., 2011) (edited volume including accounts of violence within LGBT relationships). 
57 See, e.g., Jane Doe, Inc., Violence Against Women, available at http://www.janedoe.
org/learn_more/what_is_vaw (describing programs addressing ―violence against women‖ 
and explaining that people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender, including men, 
may also be subjected to gender-based violence). 
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end intimate partner and sexual violence. The concept of ―framing‖ 
developed from Erving Goffman’s identification of the phrase
58
 to denote 
―schemata of interpretation‖ that enable individuals ―to locate, perceive, 
identify, and label‖ occurrences in daily life and in society.
59
 The concept 
has been useful in social movement theory, which recognizes ―framing‖ 
as a key aspect of political success.
60
 
Successful frames eventually become markers of the discourse and 
set the parameters and terms of the movement’s central issues or 
concerns. When effective, collective action frames mobilize potential 
movement participants and inspire and legitimate social movement 
campaigns.
61
 Sociologists have identified key concepts that inform a 
frame’s resonance, including empirical credibility, theoretical 
consistency, centrality and salience.
62
 In addition, the concept of 
realignment processes recognizes the ways social movements change in 
reaction to political and cultural shifts in order to remain useful.
63
 
A brief analysis of a few of these concepts as they apply to the 
gender-specific frame confirms the frame’s limitations.
64
 For example, 
frame theory looks at whether the frame is consistent with corresponding 
empirical data. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, empirical data 
confirms the gender-specific frame’s limits in describing the gendered 
parameters of intimate partner and sexual violence. Consistency between 
the frame and a movement’s articulated beliefs, claims and actions is 
another measure of a frame’s strength. As detailed in previous sections of 
this essay, the gender-specific frame creates tensions with theoretical 
approaches, including gender and queer, intersectionality, and feminist 
theories. Centrality and salience are other measures of a frame’s power 
that consider how essential are beliefs, values, and ideas associated with 
                                                                                                             
58 ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF 
EXPERIENCE (1974). 
59 David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464 (1986). 
60 See, e.g., Charlotte Ryan & William A. Gamson, Are Frames Enough?, in JEFF 
GOODWIN & JAMES M. JASPER, THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER: CASES AND CONCEPTS 
167 (2d ed. 2009); David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of 
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MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 136 (1992). 
61 Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: 
An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 614 (2000). 
62 See generally, e.g., Snow et al., supra note 59; Snow & Benford, supra note 60; 
Benford & Snow, supra note 61. For further discussion, see Goldscheid, Gender 
Neutrality, supra note *, at Part III.A. 
63 See, e.g., Snow et al, supra note 59, at 464–76. 
64 See Nixon & Humphreys, supra note 21, at 139 (critiquing the gender-specific frame 
and arguing that a more nuanced frame is now needed to reflect empirical evidence and 
survivors’ experiences). 
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movement frames to the lives of movement participants. In this regard, 
the gender-specific frame may be less central to movement participants’ 
identity than it had been at earlier stages of the movement to end gender 
violence. Today, the frame, on its own, fails to encompass survivors’ full 
experiences, which show that men as well as women may be survivors 
and that other forms of subordination also inform the experience of 
intimate partner and sexual violence. And the gender-specific frame may 
be less resonant with cultural narrations as popular identification with a 
―feminist‖ movement shifts form.
65
 
Frame theory’s notion of ―realignment processes‖ is particularly 
useful in that it recognizes framing as an ongoing, dynamic process. 
Shifts in the political and cultural context render the gender-specific 
frame less resonant now than it had been in the past. A number of 
factors, including the empirical issues discussed above, the increased 
recognition of the role of multiple identities in framing the experience of 
abuse, increased awareness of abuse in LGBT relationships, and the rise 
of the so-called ―fathers’ rights‖ movement, render the gender-specific 
frame less consistent with how survivors and allies see the issues. The 
frame grew out of a political movement borne of a particular moment in 
time. As the movement succeeded in raising awareness, reducing formal 
inequalities and supporting legal, policy, and programmatic change, it 
left in its wake an ongoing need for political discourse. A revised frame 
should both give voice to survivors from all social locations and cultural 
backgrounds and should emphasize a structural approach that recognizes 
the role of multiple sources of oppression and interlocking systems of 
power and dominance.
66
 A shift to a broader frame holds potential to 
support coalition work and broader campaigns for reform. 
III. CONTEXTUALIZED GENDER-NEUTRALITY 
Notions of realignment processes teach that political and cultural 
changes can spur accompanying shifts in frames in order for them to 
remain useful. Gender-specific terminology initially represented a 
political frame for the anti-violence movement, focusing attention on the 
ways intimate partner violence reflected historic gender biases and 
disproportionately impacted women. In the United States, with several 
decades of advocacy behind us and with a changing landscape ahead, a 
                                                                                                             
65 See generally, e.g., JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG 
WOMEN, FEMINISM AND THE FUTURE (2000) (tracing changes in the meaning of feminism 
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new approach would better capture the potential for progressive reform. 
 In 1982, scholar and activist Susan Schechter emphasized the 
importance of advocacy that focused on both services and politics.
67
 
Although those two directions are inextricably intertwined, they 
represent distinct perspectives. The anti-domestic violence movement 
has been marked by tensions between the two; for example, between 
those who focus on improving the availability and quality of services and 
those who believe in the primacy of building a liberation movement.
68
 
Re-framed terminology should advance these two distinct, but linked, 
trajectories. 
I suggest a modest shift that meets both descriptive and 
transformative goals and that is sensitive to differences in context and 
usage. The default term ―violence against women‖ would be replaced by 
a default to the term ―gender-based violence‖ or ―gender violence.‖ That 
switch produces a focus on the gendered impact of abuse without 
inscribing the problem as tied to women alone.
69
 Those gendered, though 
neutral, terms are most useful when broadly describing a category of 
conduct, rather than a way to describe a particular act. For example, the 
term ―gender violence‖ may be used broadly to reference a range of 
conduct, for example, intimate partner and sexual violence, in service of 
political advocacy, public discourse, and movement building.
70
 
Particularized and descriptive terms such as ―intimate partner violence‖ 
or ―sexual assault,‖ may be suited to legislation or descriptions of 
programs or services, given the need to distinguish between and among 
different types of gender violence.
71
 Even with ―neutral‖ language, 
transformative goals can be advanced by modifying that language with 
phrases recognizing the underlying conduct’s social location. For 
example, terms such as ―intimate partner violence‖ can be followed by a 
                                                                                                             
67 SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 242. 
68 Id. 
69 Here I agree with Darren Rosenblum that categorical but neutral terms, such as 
―sex‖ or ―gender,‖ which alternately are used in the context of general anti-discrimination 
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See Rosenblum, supra note 29, at 150–58. 
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71 See, e.g., Safe Horizon, http://www.safehorizon.org (victim services organization 
listing programs for survivors of, inter alia, domestic violence, rape and sexual assault, 
child abuse and incest, stalking, and trafficking). 
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phrase stating that it is ―committed primarily by men against women,‖ to 
retain a focus on social context. 
This proposal to default to the gender-neutral ―gender violence‖ 
frame is not absolute; the ideal frame will depend on context. Gender-
specific frames may be valuable in challenging legal frameworks that 
sanction gender violence through formal legal inequalities.
72
 They may 
be strategically useful in particular organizing campaigns.
73
 What is key 
is that the frame is intentionally selected to ensure that, in context, it best 
advances the twin goals of supporting comprehensive services and 
challenging ongoing biases without unnecessarily reinscribing 
essentialist notions of gender and excluding gender-nonconforming 
survivors. 
Regardless, the gender-neutral shift alone is not enough. To sustain 
and advance the political and transformative goals underlying the 
―gender-specific‖ frame, any shift in terminology must be accompanied 
by a reinvigorated commitment to challenging inequality and bias 
directly.
74
 The last several decades of advocacy reveal that we cannot 
rely on the gender-specific frame, or any frame alone, to do that work. It 
goes without saying that a gender-neutral frame will not eliminate 
challenges from those who reject the notion that intimate partner and 
sexual violence is linked with sex discrimination. Instead, challenges to 
gender-based biases and stereotypes could focus debate on challenging 
those and related biases, rather than debating whether men are bona fide 
victims. 
This proposal is modest in that many initiatives already use gender-
neutral but contextualized formulations.
75
 The proposal calls for a more 
self-conscious use of frame and a move away from reflexive use of the 
woman-specific frame to better support inclusive services and revived 
political advocacy. A shift away from the woman-specific frame requires 
acknowledging that men are sometimes victims and that intimate partner 
and sexual violence takes many forms, not all of which replicate the 
classic gendered narrative. It recognizes that violence in intimate 
relationships may not be entirely distinct from other forms of violence in 
our culture. Recognizing that not all cases fit the classic gender narrative 
                                                                                                             
72 See, e.g., U.N. WOMEN, PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN 28–31 (2011–2012), 
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need not minimize the value and importance of the gender lens. The 
nuanced realities instead reflect the complexity of the problem, which 
should be recognized rather than obscured. 
Some may be concerned that a shift away from a woman-specific 
frame may result in the loss of that frame’s expressive effect, and its 
power to shift the social meaning of abuse.
76
 The frame ―gender-
violence‖ can convey the same symbolic meaning by drawing attention 
to the disproportionate impact intimate partner and sexual violence has 
on women. It has the advantage of doing so without implicitly suggesting 
that only women are adversely impacted as its victims. 
In fact, a contextualized gender-neutral frame holds greater potential 
than a gender-specific frame to advance progressive reform. By 
emphasizing and challenging patterns of discrimination while not 
limiting the status of survivor to those of a particular identity category, a 
contextualized gender-neutral approach can best advance equality-
oriented reforms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The issue of gender and violence illustrates how our increasing 
understanding of entrenched social issues requires us to embrace both 
general principles and the limits of those generalities.
77
 If we track the 
core feminist principle of building policy based on lived experience, we 
should create opportunities to grapple with these seeming contradictions 
and complex realities. A contextualized gender-neutral approach can 
provide the frame to advance progressive reform. 
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